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THE  CONMISSION' S  FIRST  ACTION  PROGRAMl•lE 
A I  D 
In July 197l,the Commission  adopted  a  paper entitled "Hemorandum  on  a 
Community  policy for development  cooperation",stating its intention to 
submit  to  the  Council  in due  course a  series of concrete measures.  This 
has  now  been done;  and  at the beginning of February 1972,  the European 
executive  published its "programme  for  a  first series of actions".  This, 
it states,  will  enable  the  ComEunity  to make  a  material  increase in its 
aid to  the  poorer countries,and to  do  so  in a  comparatively ne'1r  future. 
This is a  particularly opportune moment  for the  Commission  to extend,in 
the  practical sphere, its existing philosophy of development  cooper::, tion. 
April 13  is  the  opening ds.te for the third UNCT.AD  conference  to  be  held at 
Santiago.  The  Six countries  of  the  Common  Narket will be  represented  by 
their own  deleg;;:.tions,and  may  take what  line  they please;  but if, in con-
formity with their expressed intention,  they wish  to  speak with a  single 
voice,this memorandum  is an  ideal instrument for bringing their points of 
view together. 
After  the  UNCTAD  conference,the Community  has another important deadline. 
This is the  meeting of  heads  of ::..tates  or governments  of  the  E.i:.:.C.  which, 
on  this occasion,  will be  in its enlarged form.  It is already settled that 
development  cooperation will be  among  the questions  on  the  agenda for this 
conference.  An  identity of views,made  clear at Santiago,  when  it is put 
on  the order  paper for the new  members  at the Summit  meeting of the  "Ten'~ 
will give  a  very special send-off  to  the  Community  policy for development 
cooperation.  As  ah;ays, the first verst is the  worst .••• 
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Four main  lines of policy 
The  first series of measures  recently put  for••ard  by  the  Commission  is  an 
integral part of  the  memorandum  of July 1971,  which  embodies  the whole 
of  the underlying  philosophy.  It must  be  emphasised  that  this is the 
first approach  on  a  deliber:"tely Community  basis  to·the  problems  of aid 
to  the  poorer countries. It also  helps  tu fill in the  blanks  left by  the 
Rome  Treaty on  this question. 
'l'o  begin  with~  the  document  insists on  the necessity of a  policy on  a 
Community  basis.  This is m:;.de  necessary by  the  imJ:~ortance of  the  European 
Community  in  ~;orld trade, which gives it special responsibilities to 
developing countries.  Another factor is  the  lowness  of  the  general  level 
of customs  duties,which means  that  the tariffs have  lost much  of their 
substance as  an  instrument  of  policy;  but  the  primary factor is  the  danger 
of incoherence in practice,  resulting from  the  present division of  competence 
and  responsibility between  the  member  countries and  the  Community  itself. 
It is this which militates in favour of a  truly Community  1:olicy iri  dev-
elopment  cooperation. 
The  enlargement  of  the .r.;uropean  Community  cvmes  at the  same  time  as  the 
beginning of  the  second  Development  Decade  of  the  United  ~ations. It is 
therefore up  to  the  Community  to  do  all in its po1·:er  to  increase  the 
effectiveness of  the  effort it makes  to  help  the  puorer  countries •  .~:or 
this  purpose,  according  to  the  Commission,  it should  conform  to  four 
governing  lines of policy  : 
l. To  integrate development  cooperation  ir:.to  the  natior;al  internal FOlicies. 
The  cooperation  policy must  not  be  kept  &;:·a.rt  from  the  gener:.:tl  internal 
h:,r:nonisa tion of  the  European  Cornmuni ty.  ;:ihould  this  !:le  the  case,  at · 1 east 
two  conse~uences might  be  expected  to  fol1ow.  On  the  one  hand,  the  progress 
toovards  harmonisation itself would  prob&bly  be  deL.yed  -:-- ho~·;, for  example, 
could  there be. fair competition between firms  inside  the  Community,  if 
their respective governments  were  helr.ing  to  falsify it in various  outside 
markets  by  the  incidence  of  their aid. 
Secondly,  if the  imp~ct of  cooperution  policy is left out  of account,  the 
scope for harmunisution  would  be vastly reduced.  A typicul instan6e  might 
arise if the  Community  had  to  take  a  view  on  the destiny of its cotton 
textile indus try without  brir"t;;ing  into  accuun t  the  interests of  the  roorer 
countries. It might,admittedly,  decide  that  this  industry shculd  be  kept 3. 
in activity;  but if the  question of cotton textiles should  then arise as 
a  matter of cooperation policy,those responsible at  the  Community  level 
would  have  no  margin for negotiation,for they would  be  confronted with an 
accomplished fact.  They  would  not be able,for example,  to  promise developing 
countries a  transfer to  their  o~m mills  of  part of the  cotton textile 
activit¥·  There are a  multitude of  similar examples;  and  this is why  the 
Commission  recommends  a  careful policy of keeping  the  internal and.external 
objectives in line with  one  another;  though  this of  course,  c~n only be 
done  by  degrees,  and  in conformity id  th a  definite  programme, so  as  to  avoid 
"abrupt  soci:1l  and  economic  repercussions  within  the  Communi ty
11
• 
2.  Progressive  coordination of national  cooneration policies 
At  present  the  competence  in questions  of  cooperation policy are divided 
between the  member  countries  of  the  Coffillluni ty  (which  of course  pb.y  a  big 
part in matters  of financial  and  technical  assist~nce) and  the  Community. 
This division,coupled with  the  simultaneous  existence of  independent national 
policies,results in a  number  of  inconveniences.  The  Commission  hopes  that 
this  can  be dealt with by harmonising  the  policies of  the  member  countries, 
both i'li th one  another and  with  the  policy of  the  Community  itself.  Co-
ordination,on  the  other hand,  does  not  mean  that  there is any wish  to  produce 
uniform and  identical policies.  The  idea is,rather,  to  introduce a  higher 
degree  of coherence,and  thus  a  greater effectiveness in a  system in which 
there will still be different  levels  of  decision. 
3.  Carrying further  the  r,.rork  the Community  has  done. 
Though  the  Corrunun~  ty i.s  .:tviare  of  the  interests of developing countries as 
a  whole,  it has  hitherto given priority to  the associated African and 
Malgasy  ,Sstates  and  the  countries in the 1'-iediterranean basin.  "This  main 
orientation of  Community  policy in relation to  .-_frica  south  o:·  the Sahara, 
and  the  l'1iediterranean basin,  must still be  maintained and,in some  aspects, 
developed.  It is a  task  the  Community  has  already accomplished;  and it 
should  be  a  starting point for developing and  applying a  cooperation policy 
in respect of developing countries  in general". 4.  Additional financial  commitments  for financial  and  technical cooperation 
must  be  envisaged. 
·~p~rt from  the resources  needed for strengthening the  cooperation  with 
African and  hedi  terrc~nean countries,  the  Commission  regards it as necessary 
that  the  Community  should be  progressively put  into  command  of the  resources 
it at present  lacks for carrying out  a  genuine  policy of development  co-
operation which  would  be better adapted,both  to its responsibilities and 
to its own  interests" 
'rhe  Commission  makes  it clear that  the additional funds  vrhich  should  be 
made  available  to  the  Community  would  not  enable it to undertake  a  co-
operation policy on a  world  scale,but would  give it the  means  to  respond 
to various  requests  from  developing countries  and  groups  of countries. 
Using  these lines of policy as a  basis,the  Commis~ion proceeded  to  foreshadow 
a  considerable number  of actions  designed for  the  "systematic  se,;rch for  the 
better international spread  of well-being".  It is among  these  that  the 
European  executive has  made  a  choice,setting aside,in the fir"'t  instance, 
those  measures  which result,in any  case,from decisions  w:i1ich  ante-date  the 
.memorandum  (such as  food  aid),which are  linked with  immediate  even~s or 
deadlines  (such as  the  "enlargement"  of  the  Yaound~ Convention)  a.rid  also 
those which it considered unripe for immediate  discussion. 
Oil-bearing  products  are not  on  the  prof.)ramrne 
Thus,the  Commission's  recent  proposals regarding basic  products  are limited 
to  three  specific sectors -- coffee,cocoa anu  sughr.  In the first stage 
notl1ing  i.s  included for oil-bearing crops. 
'rhis is an instance of the  sense  of political realism \vhich  marks  the 
Cowmission 's proposals.  1'here  vrould  not  be  much  practical usefulness  in an 
action  programme  in which  each individual  item would.be  sure  to give rise 
to  interminable discussion.  It seemed  much  bettor to  choose  a  middle  way 
and  propose  action \·ihich  v:ould  not automatically  come  up  against deep-
seated opposition.  This  does  not  mean  that  the  Commission's  proposals  are 
devoid  of  content -- any  such assertion would  be far of  the mark,and  this for  two  reasons.  In  the first  place, the  Commission  11as  careful  to  make  it 
clear that it had  not  11i. thdra\m from any of  the  proposals  contained  in its 
document  of July 1971.  Among  these  was  the  improvement  in the lot of 
migrants,&nd  the reorganisation of  the  world  market  for oil-bearing products. 
It also  contained  a  number  of other items,such as  the  setting up of a 
Community  guarantee  system for private investment,and  the  formation  of  a 
data bank  on  investment potentialities in developing countries. 
Secondly,there  can  be  no  denying  that if the  Commission's  recent  proposals 
should  come  effectively into force,this  might  call in question a  considerable 
number  of  exi:3ting attitudes and  ve:.;;ted  interests. 
-~·[hl=tt  then are  the  measures  ',,;hich  tht~  Cor:unission desires  the  Community  to 
adopt at  this stage  ?  The  action called for is both of a  co:~.merci<.d  c:.nd  of 
a  financial  type.The  Coi:;;,,ission  considers  thut  the  only action l.'hich  will 
give  a  consistent effect  to financial  uid is to  stimulate the  e:,pcrts  from 
developing countries ·'.nu  to  provide, in one  form  or ::motber,  price  gu~,rantees 
for  tropical  products.  v.' i thou  t  this  conunercial  element,  it is argued, 
finance  aid  would  serve  only  to  cover deficits resulting from  :poor sales. 
1.  Trade -- going  beyond.  the  simple  tariff concessions. 
On  the  commercial si:le,the outntanciing- Commission  proposals are aimed at 
impusing  a  discir,line on  the  markets  for coffee, cocoa  and  sug,-'r,  thr~  three 
main basic products. 
Coffee -- accent  on  structur·J.l  reform 
In terms  of  the value  of  the  international trade,coffee is seconl  only 
to oil. It is  the source of subst<:mtial  income  to  countries  such as  Brazil, 
Colombia, the  Ivory Coast  and  !•lexica.  In recent  ye~1rs  the  world market, 
despite  the  decline in Brazilinn production,  has  been  characterised by 
persistent surpluses.  ;.;Jince  1962,the marLet  has  been in  the  hands  of the 
Interna  tiono.l  Coffee  _,greement, to  \vhich  the  chic::f  producing  and  consuming 
cowatrie~ l1ave  subscribed.  Defore  each crop-yeur  the.members  of  the  agree-
ment  fix, for  •=kch  variety of coffee,  maximum  and  minimum  prices and  ezr,ort 
quotas.  11hen  illi;;.rket  prices are  al>ove  the  maximum  or below  the  minimum 6. 
thus  provided.,the fixed  quotas areeither increased or lowered.  Over  the 
past decade  these  procedures  led  to  stabilisation on  the  short-term;  but 
despite  the  expenditure  from  the Diversification Fund,  administered.  by  the 
lntern.::~tional Coffee  Organisation  ~rcot it has  not  proved  pos::;ible  to  secure 
equilibrium on  the  medium  or longer-term. 
The  agreement  comes  to an  end  in October 1971;  and  the first 'wrk on its 
renewal is to begin in 1972.  The  Commission  desires  the  Community,as  a  unit, 
to  take  an  active part in this work.  Its view is,that the  Community  should 
insist on  "seeking a  long-term balance between  production and  consumption". 
For this  purpose all that would  be nedessary would  be  to give effect  to 
instruments already contained in the existing agreement, but  \·rhich  hav•:;;  in 
some  rr~easure' been allowed  to  lie dormant.  The  diversification fund  should 
not  devote  the  main  p:c1rt  of its effort to  limiting production, but  should 
also  take  steps  in regard  to storage,processing and  conditioning of the 
product  and  the  mark~ting circuits.  ~ubject to  these  conditions,the  Community 
should  be  prepared  to make  a  finuncial  contribution to the Fund,as  indeed 
two  of  the  member  countries are already doing. 
Cocoa -- international agreement if possible;  partial agreement if necessary  -----------------------------------------------------------.-----------------. 
Cocoa  plays  only a  comparatively small  part  in world  trade.  i'or countries 
such as Ghana,the  Ivory Coast,Nigeria and  Cameroon,however,  it is a  sub-
stantial source of income.  Producers  in these countries have not  the benefit 
of any  price guarantee.  They  are  thus at the  mercy  of price fluctuations; 
and  since these have at present  carried the  price to  a  low  level,  they are 
endeavouring,vlith their governments,  to  take  over  the burden of stabilisation. 
The  signature of a  world  agreement  has  been  envisaged  ruany  times;  but  each 
time it has  been rejected because of  the  oprlosi tion of  some  of  the  big 
consuming cuuntries,particularly the United ;;tates.  This is a  situc:.tion 
which subjects producers  t;)  serious uncertuinties,and the  Commission  would 
like to  bring it to  an  end.  It therefore hopes  that  the  initiative taken 
in UhCTAD  will resul  t,as quickly as  possible,  in the signature of  a  viorld 
agreement.  If attempts  in this direction should  result in yet another 
failure,  the ·Commission  v;oul·:i.  be  prepf~red to  go  further and  "cooperate in 
the  operation of  a  limited agreement"  from  1973  onwurds. 7. 
It should  be  emphasised  that  this propusal is particularly generous.  In 
1973  the  Community will have Great Britain among  its members, and  vlill  thus 
be  by far the biggest  world  importer of  cocoa.  This  ;-,ould  mean  that  the 
content  of a  limited agreement  would  be  considerable;  and it ~ould also 
give rise to  ndditional  expenditure  which,becau.::;e  of  the  scale of Community 
buying would  be far from  negligible.  Horeover,  it must  be  remembered  that 
the  countries  now  associ~ted with the  Community  produce  nearly 80% of  the 
world's  cocoa  crop.  The  Commission could,therefure,  have  limited its action 
to  proposing a  regional  agreement  beb1een  the  CoWllluni ty as  an  imJ·orter  ;;~nd 
its assocL.tea as  producers.  It has  instead preferred  to  ~ropose an  agree"-
ment  which  would  include  among its beneficiaries the  non-as:~ociated countries 
which  provide  some  20  5~  of  the  world's  production -- including Brazil, 
.to..:¢Uador  and  the Dominican Republic. 
~~~~-==-!~~-£~~!~~~~~-£~~!!~£!_~~!~~~~-~~~~~-£~~~-~~~-~~~! 
The  case  of  sug::tr is very different from  the  t>vo  others.  In  the fj.rst 
place  the  ::lix-na  tion E;uropec:m  Community,  ~.,hich does  not  produce  a  single 
ounze  of cocoa or coffee  on its own  territory,is in fact  a  sugar producer 
with a  surplus  beyond its own  requirements.  ~Jecondly,  many  experts  u.gree 
th~t there· is likely to  be  a  coLsiderable increase in the \vorld' s  suga.r 
consumption,  •;rhich  nou  runs  around  75  million tons  o..nnually,&nd is expected 
to reach  105  million tons  by 1980.  This is in i tsel-7.'  an opti;dstic outlook 
which  coco~'- and  coffee  do  not  share.  'rhe  scale of  the  GX}Jected  incre,J.se 
is,hcwcver,  the heart of the  problem. 
The  qur-;stion  vthich arises is vrho  vdll  produce  the  enormous  extra quL.nti ties 
of sugar required during  the  present decade.  If things  rer:;ain  as  they are, 
it is believed that  the rich countries might  very vlell  supply as  much  as 
85  >o  of  the  increase.  The  result might  even be, that  they hOuld  be  exporting 
part of their production to developing countries ,a:wng  ·,Ihich  the increase 
in conswniJt:Lon  Nould.  be  by far the  most  pronounced.  With  such  prOS})ects, 
the  part uhich  the  Comruuni ty should  pLw remains  to  be decided.  'l'he 
Comrr:.ission,admittedly,has  not as yet  made  unduly precise suggestions. 
Everything •·;ill.  depend  on  decisions  taken  on  three de£idline d. a tes in the 
early future  : 8. 
- re-negotiation of the \'lorld  Jugar Agreement  vThich  comes  to  an end  in 
1973.  This  agreement, \·Ihich  came  into  r·orce in 1969, covers half the Horld 
trade in sugar and  includes  regulated  prices  and  mutual  agreements  by 
the signatory countries in regard to  purchases and  supplies  •. The 
United  States,because of their preferential agreements with a  number 
of countries_,  especially in Central and  South America,  are not members 
of the agreement;  and  the European  Community,because  of its sugar 
l 
production surpluses,  is also not  a  member. 
renewal  in 1974  of  the  Conunomrealth  Sugar Agreement,unier 1i.rhich  Great 
Britain guarantee::;  import  quotas at pre-fixed prices  to  Commonwealth 
countries  (the  Caribbean,Jar:mica,Hauri tius). 
the fixing 'in 1975,under the  Common  Agriculture Policy of  the  Common 
I·Iarket,of 'the  definite regulation applic&ble  to  s;.~ga.r  beet~ 'l'his  may 
give rise to  the distribution of nevi  beet  production quotas  among  the 
member  countries (it 1'iill be  re:neubered  that the  price of beet is 
sv.bject to  a  full guarantee up  to a  specific quotci,a partial {>"llarantee 
for another  35  %  of this  amount  and  no  guarantee for any further 
production). 
In all three cases  the attitude of the  Community  'vTill  be  of  primary 
importance for the developing countries  11hich  are sugar producers.  For 
the moment  the  Commission not  insisting on  the Community's  participation 
in t_he  International  Sug.::;.r  Agreement, even  though  the enlargement  of  the 
Community 'will,after all,  have  made  the E.E.C.  a  deficit area.  The 
Commission  seems  to  be  reserving its attitude till it has  more  information 
about  the methods  and  conditions for the  renevial  of the  C .S .A.  This  expires 
after the  International Agreement;  and it may.be  supposed  that  Community 
representatives will be  increasing their contacts with  the  Comn1onwealth 
sugar producers ,and  also  1-Ti th the  producer::;  in the  associO.  ted  .:..frican 
countries and  I'lado.gascar,in order to arrive at a  reasom;cbly  exact assess-
ment  of the  qu:,;nti ties and  prices  v1hich  vrill  be  governed  by  the guarantees. 
When  it comes  to  fixing quotas, there is one  point of policy abcut  •~hich 
there is no  longer any doubt.  The  Commission  proposes  that  "after the 
enlargement  of  t'he  Community, its sugar production should remain below its 
total consumption;  and  the  gap to be filled by Community  imports vlill 
depend  on  the undertakings it has  given  to  the developing countries". 9. 
This aspect may  raise a  number  of questions  in Community  farming circles 
unless,indeed,  the  government~;; take  the  same  attitude as  the  Commission, 
reducing the  taxes falling on sugar products,so that consumption is 
stimulated.  It might  then happen that sugar  cane  and beet will be  better 
bedfellows. 
Getting to know  the  Community  market 
Apart from  the action contemplated  regarding coffee,cocoa and  sug~r,  the 
Commission  suggests  a  number  of measures  uimed  to.stimulate.the exports 
from  developing countries.  It has  in fact  come  to  the  conclusion,that 
nowadays  "it is not  enough  to  reL:love  the tariff .s.nd  non-tari±'f obstacles" 
to  secure an automatic  increase in the  volume  of trade. 
It is therefore necessary to  take special care  that  the  developing 
countries  improve  their market  penetration technique.  The  Community  now 
has at its disposal its experience  with  the existing African associ'  .. tes, 
and it is thus in a  position to  improve  the  methods  of  these importers, 
so  as  to  "give  them  a  better kno\vledge  of the  Community  market".  In 
addition, the  member  countries might  foL..ovl  the  example  of Germany  and  the 
NetheJ:"lands,1'1hich  have  special cooper,.:.tion  centres with the developing 
countries.  The  Community  might  also  provide  technical aid  "for product 
improvement  and standardisation". This  should  enable  the  exporters  of'  the 
Third \v'orld  to adapt  themselves  to  Community  stand:.:.rds  and  to  the  tastes 
of their European customers. 
Promotion of Europe's  consumption.of tropical nroducts. 
The  Commission  suggests  two  types  of measure,aimed at  inc~easing the 
Community  consumption of  tropical foodstuffs. 
In the first instance it calls for  the  progressive elimination of  excise 
duties on  products  such as  coffee,tea,bananas and  cocoa.  On  the  other hand 
the  Commission  does  not  take it for granted  that the disappearance of 
these duties  would  be  automatically followed  by higher consumption.  It 
believes  that "there are strong reasons for thinking a  lowering of the 
prices of  these  products  would  create better marketing conditions".  In . 
' 
10. 
any case  the  Commission  has  a  good  case in calling for a  substantial 
cut in the  excise duties,if' not for their total suppression.  Did not  the 
member  countries undertake -- when  they adopted their economic  and  monetary 
union  programme  on February 9,1971 -- to harmonise  their indirect  taxes  ? 
In addition,  the Commission  suggests  there  should be set up  for  these 
products  a  system of protected indication of origin  •.  Nowadays  the food 
industries use  growing quantities of organic ingredients;  and it would  be 
desirable for natur:ctl  products  to be brought into the foreground  by  such 
methods  as  commercial  labelling,Hhich would  of course huve  to be  subjected 
to very strict control.  In this respect  the  case of veget<1ble  oils is 
extremely significant.  They are unduly easily  propag~ted as being of 
superior que.li  ty;  but it may  well happen  that  they do  not  have  the  "purity" 
so  emphatically claimed in the advertising.  fiioreover,  even if producers 
are subjected  to a  certain discipline by regUlations  on  the use  of the 
"na  tu.ral  product"  label,  the  consumer  vmu.ld  become  conscious  of an extensive 
range  of oils,such as  colza  (rape-seed),soya,olive,groundnut and  others. 
It thus  becomes  important  that  the  consumer  should know.  something about 
the differences  between  these various  oils.,  and  Hhether  and  1·1hen  one  of  them 
may  be of better quulity and healthier than another. 
2.  Finance aid -- a  bigger effort and  more  harmonisation 
The  Commission  proposals,as we  have  seen,  are some\·Jhat  elabor.:.:te  on be 
commercial  side.  They  do  not,however,omit  to  bring into  consicler,_tion  the 
other important aspect of  develo~;ment cooper:.;tion irhich  consists of fin.mce 
aid. 
The  first class of action  ~roposed in the finance  aid sector is specially 
ambitious.  'rhe  Commission  asks  that,  conformably to  international re-
commendations  wi,ich  nave  been made,  each of  the  rm:;mber  countries should, 
by 1975,have scalaiup the  public aid to  0.7  ')'a  of its GNP  (and  private aid 
to 0.3 )b).  For such a  country as Italy,for example,  this w.ould  mean 
multiplying the existing public aid  by no  less  than 4;  and for Germany 
the corresponding figure  vrould  be 2.5.  If all the member  cow.1.tries  >·sere 
to accept  the  Commission  pro:)osal, the  Community  ·.wuld  be  doubling the 11. 
total volume  of its aid.  The  Commission  gives  a  clear account  of its reasons 
for recommending  such an increase in the effort made.  In 1970, the  0.  7  ~&  target 
was  not  reached by any of  the member  countries;  and  since l960,there has  been 
a  consistent tendency for  the  appropriations made  by the  member  countrj.es  to 
diminish,l·d  th the  solitary exception of the  l~etherlands. J'lloreover,  the fall 
in the aid itself has  been  accomp.'.mied  by a  fall in the unit  purchasing  power 
of  the aid  whir.h  the Europeans  have  been granting.  If this were  to continue, 
the  consequences  for some  of the  poorer countries might  be  disastrous.  The 
Commission  also insists on  the need for finance  aid  to be given by the  member 
countries  on a  regular basis.  F'or  this  purpose it v10uld  be  necessary for  each 
of  the  member  countries  to  enact  pluri-annual  programme  la>·is.  In  the  frame\·:ork 
of  the  Community  medium-term  policy,the comparison of these different  programme 
lmvs  might  well result in some  degree  of harmonisation.  It would  thus  become 
easier for  the developing countries  to  plan their investment  programmes  in 
advance. 
Alleviation of the debt  charges 
The  second  type  of action mentioned  by the  Commission under  the finance  heading, 
relates to  the alleviation of the charges  to  be  borne  by the poorer countries.  -, 
This  objective might,in the first inst<::nce,  be  re:.ched  by harmoni.:;ing  the 
conditions  on  which 
11public aid,whether bi-lateral or from  the  Community"  is 
granted.  This  ·:rould  eliminate various  situr:.tions which are,to say ths least, 
paradoxical.  Commission  experts have in fact  disclosed that in present  circum-
st<mces, and  uepending on the countries  concerned, 
11projects of  the  same  nature 
and  comp.::trable  profitability are  fin~:.nced on  very different  terms
11
•  These 
differences are highly prejudicial to  the  poorer countries;  for  the  donors 
v1ho  are  most  liber&l  d-.::;  not  vlish, especially i•rhen  they c.re  particip:.1. ting in 
a  multi-l:~teral fin:cnce  scheme
11  to  find  they are indirectly subsidising the 
interest paid  out  to donors  who  huve  been less liberal".  In these  conditions 
the  "liberal11  donors  have  a  way  o:f:'  accepting  the  terms  of  the 
11tough",Hhich 
vmrks  out  to  the  disadv~ntage of'  the developing countries. 
The  Commission  also  notes  thEit  there has, in recent  yehrs,  been  a  tendency 
for  the aid given by lJay  of  don:::. tion to decrease  by  cornpc.rison  >·ri th the 
loans •  .As  another method  of lightening the  charges  borne by  the  }ioorer countries, 
. 
' 12. 
the  Commission  suggesto  that  the member  cow1tries  should increase the 
proportion of donations.  Finally,the  Commis~ion proposes  that in the field of 
export credits,account  should  be  ta~en of the  conditions  in the developing 
countries  themselves,for the  Community  is a  predominant  sou1ce  of supply for 
credits in this class.  ::lpecial  c:;.re  should be  taken that "the use of the 
goods  supplied under the creuit results in a  net financial profitability in 
foreign currency  (or at least in economic  profit)  exceeding  the interest 
charge;  and  that  the  economic  life of the goods  is at least as  long as  the 
periqd laid down  for repayment  of the  loan11 • 
These  recommendations  are  primarily made  to  private exporters,from >rhom  they 
will require a  genuine effort of re-adaptation.  '.i'his  might  be  undertuken in 
the  Community  coordination group for credit insurance. 
Finally,the Commission  emphasises  that if nothing were  to  be  done  to  make  the 
terms  of  the aid more  flexible  (especially the rates and  the  dur<~tion  )  quite 
a  number  of developing couu1tries  might,within a  decade,  find  themselves  obliged 
to  be  making  repayments  on  a  higher scale than  the  loans  received 
End  of the 
11reserved  enclosure
11
• 
Another  proposal by the Commission is aimed  :;;.t  encouraging the  progressive 
liberdion,on the Community  scale, of  the aid made  available.  The  practice of 
tied aid consists,it vlilibe remembered,  "in the  obligation laid on  the 
beneficiary to use  the aid received in the  country from  t·Jhich  it was  given". 
This is clearly to  the advantage  of the richer countries,  because it IJromotes 
their exports  and lifts their firms  above  the perils of internatiunal trade; 
but it is often a  prejudice  to  the  poorer  countries  v1ho, 1:/hen  they carry  out 
their investment  projects,  are not able  to  place their contracts outside  the 
aiding  country,  even  ti:lOU€;;h  they might  thus get better ter:ns  01.~  better technical 
service. 
The  member  States have  already made  some  progress in untying their aid,since 
that  vThich  is t;i  ven by  the European Development  }'und  h: itself untied.  The 
CoiiUnis::;ion, however,  considers  that  tied aid perpetuates vmtertigi1t  compart-
ments  v1hich  are inconsistent 'Hi th the  progress  tm:ards  economic  and.  wonetary 
union,and is therefore anxious  to  go  further.  'l'o  do  so it ,,:ill  be  necessary 13. 
to  t·ake  action step-by-step, largely based  on  the respective  sh::;.res  of each 
member  country in the gifts and  loans.  As  is well knovm,  governments are 
increasingly apt  to tie their aid in proportion as it is given in the form  of 
donations.  Counsels of  prudence have  led  the  Commission  to  limit its re-
commendation in the first stage to  the  ur1tying of a  comparatively modest 
proportion-- the bi-lateral public  loans.  In 1970,thEWamounted for the  ~ix 
countries as  a  vi hole,  to  about  $  650  milJ.ion. 
In order to  avoid  the  vrastes  which result from  the  lack of harmonisation  beb1een 
the aid granted by  the  member  coUlltries  individually and  the Community  as  a 
whole,the Commission  suggests  a  systematic  centralisation in Brus9els  of  the 
information relating to  the granting of loans  and  donations.  'l'his  '  .. ould  enable  i 
it to  spotlight  "the overlapping, or possible  gaps";  and it >vould  make  it 
possible for each of  thR  Six  countries  to  adapt,or rectify,  their aid 
programmes. 
In a  final proposal  the Cominission  recommends  encouraging cooperation bet>teen 
the developing countries  themselves  by  establishing special  connections uith 
the  regional groupings.  This  tlould mitigate the disadvantages  \'Thich  are  inherent 
in the  smallness  of the mark2t  in most  of  the  poorer countries.  The  assistance 
Ullder  this heading may.  take various  forms,inclti.ding  training courses for 
nationals of the developing countries;  the organisation-of discussions;  the 
sending of experts  to keep  touch with integration experiments;  and  the  under-
taking of investigations of regional interest. According to  the  Commission, 
the  regionalisation of aid  on  these lines  should  encourage  a  spirit of co-
oper~tion between neighbouring countries as it has  done  in the case  of  the 
Community's  o~n African associates. 
The  proposed me.s:.sures  reYie~<led in the  above, both for  commercial  coopcra  tion 
and  for finance aid,  bear "\:i tness  to  the  desire of  the  Commission  to  make  a 
determined attack on  one  of  the major  problems  of our  time.  'rhere is in this 
a  reason for believing that  the 
11programme  for a  first seri"'ls  of actions" 
will not  be  swamped  in vain  squ:~bbles betHeen  the  experts. 
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